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Notes and Comments
Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc.: A Missed Opportunity to
Restore Fundamental Fairness to Public
Forum Analysis
I. Introduction
Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.1 exempli-
fies the fundamental unfairness inherent in the public forum/
nonpublic forum distinction currently used by the Supreme
Court in addressing first amendment challenges to governmental
regulations affecting government property.2 If a court deter-
mines that a specific public property constitutes a public forum,
the court will apply strict scrutiny3 in ruling on the constitution-
1. 107 S. Ct. 2568 (1987).
2. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Jews for Jesus Court, succinctly summarizes
the current public forum analysis applied by the Supreme Court:
In balancing the government's interest in limiting the use of its property
against the interests of those who wish to use the property for expressive activity,
the Court has identified three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the pub-
lic forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum. The
proper First Amendment analysis differs depending on whether the area in ques-
tion falls in one category rather than another. In a traditional public forum or a
public forum by government designation, we have held that First Amendment
protections are subject to heightened scrutiny .... We have further held, how-
ever, that access to a nonpublic forum may be restricted by government regulation
as long as the regulation "is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression
merely because officials oppose the speaker's view."
Id. at 2571 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (emphasis added)). For examples of the
Court's application of its current public forum analysis, see infra notes 80-99, 142-166,
and accompanying text.
3. Justice O'Connor used the equivalent term "heightened scrutiny" in her Jews for
Jesus opinion. Jews for Jesus, 107 S. Ct. at 2571. See supra note 2. Strict scrutiny is
applied by the courts when reviewing government regulations which infringe on funda-
mental constitutional rights. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
1
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ality of government restrictions directed at communicative activ-
ity conducted within that public property.' On the other hand, if
a court determines that a specific public property is a nonpublic
forum, the court will apply to those same government restric-
tions a deferential reasonableness test."
The Supreme Court framed the issue presented in Jews for
Jesus as "whether a resolution banning all 'First Amendment
activities' at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) violates
the First Amendment."' Justice O'Connor, writing for a unani-
mous Court, stated that "the [LAX] resolution is facially uncon-
stitutional under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine,"7
thus enabling the Court to sidestep the issue of whether LAX is
a public forum8 - one of the questions on which the Supreme
Court originally granted certiorari.'
Although the Jews for Jesus Court was correct in its over-
breadth decision, its failure also to address the public forum is-
sue reflects a regrettable reluctance on the part of the Supreme
Court to rectify a problem it created by a line of decisions begin-
ning with Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights0 and continuing
through such recent cases as Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n" and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and
Educ. Fund.2 The problem created by the Court is disparate
LAW § 14.3, at 531 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]. For a discussion of what
rights (in addition to the right of freedom of speech) are currently held to be fundamen-
tal by the Court, see NOWAK § 11.7, at 370-72. A regulation which infringes on a funda-
mental right will pass constitutional muster only where such regulation is shown to be
"necessary to serve a compelling state interest and ... is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end." Jews for Jesus, 107 S. Ct. at 2571 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45).
4. Jews for Jesus, 107 S. Ct. at 2571.
5. Id. See supra note 2.
6. Jews for Jesus, 107 S. Ct. at 2570.
7. Id. at 2571.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2573 (White, J., concurring).
10. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (city ban against political advertising on available commer-
cial advertising space on vehicles of a city transit system held constitutional because the
Court concluded that such vehicles are not public forums). Id. at 304. See infra note 83.
11. 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (denial of access to school district's internal mail system and
teachers' mailboxes to rival union held constitutional because these mail facilities did
not constitute a public forum). Id. at 48, 55.
12. 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (executive order excluding legal defense and political advo-
cacy organizations from participation in a charity drive held to be constitutional because
charity drive found to be a nonpublic forum). Id. at 806, 813.
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treatment of individuals wishing to exercise first amendment
rights on public property based solely upon whether a court, at
the outset, classifies the property as a public forum or a nonpub-
lic forum. Further evidence that a problem does indeed exist is
provided by the dissents in the above-named cases, 3 by com-
mentators who have previously addressed the public forum is-
sue, and by the procedural background of Jews for Jesus.15
Background on the Supreme Court's use of the overbreadth
doctrine in addressing first amendment issues will be dealt with
briefly in Part II before turning to the development of the public
forum concept, which constitutes the major focus of this Note.
Part III will present the facts, procedural history, and summa-
ries of the majority and concurring opinions in Jews for Jesus.
Part IV will provide an analysis of the opinion and will suggest
how the Court could have dealt with the public forum question
in a manner that would restore a fundamental fairness that is
lacking in the Supreme Court's current application of the public
forum/nonpublic forum distinction in addressing first amend-
ment challenges to regulations affecting government property.
Part V concludes that the failure to address the public fo-
rum issue presented in Jews for Jesus constitutes a missed op-
portunity to correct a problem that will continue to plague both
lower courts and governmental bodies until the Supreme Court
restructures its current public forum analysis.
II. Background
A. The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine
As noted by the dissenting justices in Gooding v. Wilson,"
the overbreadth doctrine is of recent origin.' 7 The doctrine per-
mits "an individual whose own speech or conduct may be pro-
13. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see infra text accompa-
nying notes 95, 99.
14. See infra notes 32, 53, 77.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 154-158.
16. 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (Georgia statute which provided that " '[any person who
shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence . . .opprobrious
words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace ... shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor,' " held to be on its face unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the
first and fourteenth amendments). Id. at 519-20.
17. Id. at 535.
1988]
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hibited . .. to challenge a statute on its face 'because it also
threatens others not before the court - those who desire to en-
gage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from
doing so rather than risk prosecution . . . . ' "'i This approach
represents a sharp departure from the Court's traditional ap-
proach of denying an individual standing to challenge a statute
on the grounds that it may possibly be unconstitutionally ap-
plied to third parties not before the Court.'9
The traditional rule was based on the belief that it is not
the purpose of courts to act as "roving commissions" charged
with the task of passing judgment on the constitutionality of all
the laws in the United States. 0 Such judgments were deemed
justified only in those cases brought before the Court for the
purpose of adjudicating the rights of actual litigants.2 The two
major exceptions to the traditional rule involve the concepts of
equal protection,22 "where individuals not parties to a particular
suit stand to lose by its outcome and yet have no effective ave-
nue of preserving their rights themselves,"23 and first amend-
ment rights, which can only be restricted by statutes narrowly
18. Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2568, 2571 (1987)
(quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985) (court of appeals
held to have erred in facially invalidating a Washington state moral nuisance law in its
entirety where partial invalidation is the required course to follow when possible)).
19. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (citing several cases chronologi-
cally, beginning with Austin v. Aldermen, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 694, 698-99 (1869), and con-
cluding with United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960)). In Broadrick, state employees
were unsuccessful in arguing that portions of a state merit system act were vague and
overbroad and, thus, facially unconstitutional, where those employees' particular conduct
was clearly proscribed by the challenged portions of the act. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 616-
18.
20. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610-11 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971)).
21. Id. at 611 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803)).
22. The fourteenth amendment provides, inter alia, that "[n]o State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Thus, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment is not applicable to the Federal Government; however, individuals are af-
forded similar protection from federal actions which violate equal protection by the due
process clause of the fifth amendment which provides that "[nlo person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST.
amend. V. See NOwAK, supra note 3, § 14.1, at 524. "Equal protection is the guarantee
that similar people will be dealt with in a similar manner and that people of different
circumstances will not be treated as if they were the same." Id. at 526 (citing Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949)).
23. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611.
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drawn to serve compelling, competing interests of society.2 4
An arguably more recent development" in the application
of the overbreadth doctrine is the requirement, introduced in
Broadrick v. Oklahoma,26 that "[a] statute may be invalidated
on its face .. .only if the overbreadth is 'substantial.' ",27 Al-
though the Court did not adequately define what it meant by
"substantial overbreadth" in Broadrick,25 it did attempt to do so
in Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent.2 9 In
Vincent, the Court equated "substantial overbreadth" with "a
realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compro-
mise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not
before the Court . . . .,,
Specifically with respect to the first amendment, the Court
has applied the first amendment overbreadth doctrine to forbid
the enforcement of a challenged statute "until and unless a lim-
iting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to re-
move the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally pro-
tected expression." 31
24. Id. at 611-12.
25. Id. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan criticized the Court for not
defining the term "substantial overbreadth" as used in Broadrick, inasmuch as "a re-
quirement of substantial overbreadth [had] already [been] implicit in the doctrine" prior
to the Court's pronouncement in Broadrick. Id. Justice Brennan also criticized the Court
for not providing a rationale justifying the Court's conclusion that overbreadth analysis
will be applied differently depending upon whether conduct or speech is involved "even
where both are equally protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 631.
26. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
27. Jews for Jesus, 107 S. Ct. at 2571-72 (citing Houston v. Hill, 107 S. Ct. 2502,
2508 (1987); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
28. See supra note 25.
29. 466 U.S. 789 (1984). The Los Angeles municipal code prohibiting the posting of
signs on public property in order to prevent visual clutter, to minimize traffic hazards,
and to prevent interference with intended use of public property was held to be constitu-
tional both on its face (thus defeating an overbreadth challenge) and as applied against
supporters of a candidate for a local elected position wishing to post political signs on
such public property. Id. at 796-817.
30. Id. at 801.
31. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
1988]
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B. The Public Forum Doctrine
1. Origin of the Traditional Public Forum
In the 1897 case of Davis v. Massachusetts,2 the Supreme
Court affirmed the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts'
conviction of a preacher who had addressed crowds in the Bos-
ton Common in violation of a city ordinance which forbade, in-
ter alia, "any public address" upon publicly owned property
"except in accordance with a permit from the mayor.""s Justice
Edward White, writing for a unanimous Court, adopted dictum
from then Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes' Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court opinion in the case, 4 stating that the Fed-
eral Constitution "does not have the effect of creating a particu-
lar and personal right in the citizen to use public property in
defiance of the constitution and laws of the State. ' 35 Justice
White concluded that "[t]he right to absolutely exclude all right
to use, necessarily includes the authority to determine under
what circumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater
power contains the lesser. '3
32. 167 U.S. 43 (1897). The history of public forum analysis presented in this Note
is purposefully limited in order to highlight only Supreme Court cases which represent
major points in the development of public forum doctrine. Readers whose interests are
piqued by this Note are encouraged to read the more detailed and excellent public forum
articles relied upon by the author of this Note. See Stone, Fora Americana: Speech In
Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233; Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum:
Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109 (1986); Werhan, The
Supreme Court's Public Forum Doctrine and the Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L.
REV. 335 (1986). See also Note, Constitutional Law - The Public Forum in Nontradi-
tional Areas - Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), 51 WASH. L.
REV. 142 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Constitutional Law]; Note, A Unitary Ap-
proach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 121 (1982). The unifying theme throughout all of these articles is the writers' recog-
nition of the importance of the right of freedom of expression guaranteed by the first
amendment, and the concomitant recognition that the Court must adopt a public forum
analysis which will adequately insure the continued protection of this fundamental first
amendment right.
33. Davis, 167 U.S. at 44.
34. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510 (1895). The lower court opinion of
then Judge Holmes in addition to confirming the conviction of Davis, stated, "For the
Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public
park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the
owner of a private house to forbid it in his house." Id. at 511.
35. Davis, 167 U.S. at 47-48.
36. Id. at 48.
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It was not until forty-two years later, in Hague v. CIO,37
that the Supreme Court placed restrictions on a government's
ability to prohibit the exercise of first amendment speech rights
on public property." In Hague, the Court was confronted with a
municipal ordinance which forbade all meetings in the streets
and other public areas without a permit.3 9 Justice Roberts' plu-
rality opinion 0 contained the following often quoted dictum es-
tablishing what is now viewed as the traditional public forum
concept:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been
a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citi-
zens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the
streets and parks for communication of views on national ques-
tions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but
relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general
comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good
order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or
denied.4"
Justice Roberts' last sentence above provided for balancing the
communicator's right to publicize his views with the society's in-
terest (represented by the state) in comfort, convenience, peace,
and order.
That the state's inconvenience must be more than slight in
order to tip the scales in its favor was established less than
seven months after Hague, in Schneider v. State.42 In Schnei-
der, the Court held unconstitutional three municipal ordinances
prohibiting leaflet distribution in order to prevent littering.4"
37. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
38. Id. at 516-18.
39. Id. at 502.
40. Id. at 500. Justice Roberts was joined in his opinion by Justice Black. Justice
Stone, joined by Justice Reed, filed a separate concurring opinion. Chief Justice Hughes
also filed a separate concurring opinion. Justices McReynolds and Butler each filed sepa-
rate dissenting opinions. Justices Douglas and Frankfurter took no part in the decision.
41. Id. at 515-16.
42. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
43. Id. at 162-65.
1988]
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Justice Roberts, writing for an overwhelming majority," con-
cluded that such inconveniences are insufficient to warrant an
absolute denial of such "fundamental personal rights and liber-
ties" as freedom of speech and of the press. 5
Although absolute denial of fundamental speech rights is
prohibited in a traditional public forum, Cox v. New Hamp-
shire46 established that less restrictive forms of regulation may
be justified in order to protect the state's interest in maintaining
the orderly and efficient use of the streets. 7 In Cox, the Court
unanimously held that an ordinance requiring a permit for any
"parade or procession upon any public street or way" 48 was a
constitutionally permissible time, place, and manner regulation
of speech-related activity.' 9 The Court, in reaching its decision,
recognized that the maintenance of public order is an essential
prerequisite to the enjoyment of constitutionally guaranteed
civil liberties.50
2. The Nontraditional Public Forum
The foregoing discussion dealt only with the recognition of a
constitutionally guaranteed first amendment right of access to a
traditional public forum.5 The acknowledgment by Justice Rob-
erts of a right of access to public property for speech purposes if
that property has traditionally been used for speech and assem-
44. Id. at 165. Justice McReynolds, the lone dissenter, filed no opinion.
45. Id. at 161.
46. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
47. The statute at issue in Cox was New Hampshire Public Law chapter 145, section
2, which required a permit for any parade or procession to be held on public property.
Id. at 571.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 576. A state or local government may impose reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on the exercise of speech-related activities within a public forum,
provided that such restrictions are applied without regard to the content of the speech
(restrictions must be content-neutral), and that such restrictions are narrowly tailored to
further legitimate government interests (such as to promote peace and order within the
forum). See NOWAK, supra note 3, § 16.47, at 970. A somewhat simplified example of a
government restriction that might, under appropriate circumstances, qualify as a reason-
able time, place, and manner restriction would be a municipality's requirement that a
march, procession or parade be conducted during daylight hours (time), along a specified
route (place), and that participants in the march walk no more than four abreast
(manner).
50. Cox, 312 U.S. at 574.
51. See supra notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
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bly52 implied that access to public property lacking such tradi-
tional use "could be denied absolutely upon the state's naked
assertion of title." 3 It was not until 1966, in Brown v. Louisi-
ana,54 that the Supreme Court showed signs of willingness to ex-
tend the right of access for speech purposes to public property
not traditionally used for first amendment activities.55
In Brown, Brown and four other blacks entered the public
room of a segregated regional library." Brown sat down while
the other four blacks stood nearby, thus silently protesting the
library's segregation policy.5 7 They were arrested approximately
ten minutes later for violation of the Louisiana breach-of-the-
peace statute58 and were subsequently convicted.5 9 In a five-to-
four decision reversing their conviction, Justice Fortas, joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas,60 recognized an indi-
vidual's "right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by
silent and reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant
has every right to be, the unconstitutional segregation of public
facilities."61
52. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
53. See Stone, supra note 32, at 238-39. Stone indicates that Justice Roberts' reli-
ance in Hague on adverse possession and public trust concepts to establish a public fo-
rum right of individuals sufficient to overcome the common-law property rights of the
state, where the property at issue was traditionally used for speech and assembly,
amounted to a failure to recognize "that access to public property for speech purposes is
essential to effective exercise of First Amendment rights... [and] created by implication
two distinct classes of public property." Id. at 238.
54. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
55. See Stone, supra note 32, at 246 (emphasis added).
56. Brown, 383 U.S. at 136.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 137-38. The statute reads as follows:
Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances
such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby: 1) crowds or congre-
gates with others ... in . .. a ... public place or building ... and who fails or
refuses to disperse and move on, or disperse or move on, when ordered so to do by
any law enforcement officer... or any other authorized person... shall be guilty
of disturbing the peace.
Id. at 138 (citing LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:103:1 (West 1962)) (footnote omitted).
59. 383 U.S. at 137-38.
60. Id. at 131. Justices Brennan and White filed separate concurring opinions. Id. at
143, 150, respectively (Brennan, White, JJ., concurring).
61. Brown, 383 U.S. at 142. Stone characterizes Justice Fortas' approach as an "im-
portant first step . . . toward acceptance of the view that the right to a public forum
could extend, in at least some instances, even to publicly owned property that manifestly
was not historically dedicated to the exercise of First Amendment rights." Stone, supra
19881
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The number of Supreme Court Justices recognizing this
right of access to a nontraditional public forum grew to four in
Adderley v. Florida.6 2 In Adderley, a group of students were
convicted under a Florida trespass statute for peacefully demon-
strating on the grounds of a county jail in order to protest the
arrest of several other students and the racial segregation which
existed within the jail.6 3 Although the students' convictions were
upheld by the majority," four justices strongly dissented.65 Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Fortas, and Brennan criti-
cized the majority for relying on the common-law property
rights of the state to deny access to the publicly owned jail
grounds.6 Justice Douglas stated that "[t]o say that a private
owner could have done the same if the rally had taken place on
private property is to speak of a different case, as an assembly
and a petition for redress of grievances run to government, not
to private proprietors."6 Rather than base their public forum
analysis on common-law property rights, the four dissenting jus-
tices advocated an approach which would exclude a proposed
speech activity only if it so interfered with the normal uses of
that public property that no accommodation would be possible."8
note 32, at 247.
62. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Fortas joined. Id. at 48 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). Stone has characterized Justice Brennan as "the new adherent [to the Fortas ap-
proach]." Stone, supra note 32, at 248.
63. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 40. The Florida trespass statute at issue, as quoted by the
Court, stated, "'Every trespass upon the property of another, committed with a mali-
cious and mischievous intent, the punishment of which is not specially provided for,
shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding three months, or by fine not exceeding
one hundred dollars.' FLA. STAT. § 821.18 (1965)." Id. at 40 n.1.
64. Id. at 48 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 52. Dienes views Adderley as "the foundation for the nonpublic-forum
doctrine." Dienes, supra note 32, at 116 (emphasis added).
67. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 52.
68. Id. at 54. "There may be some public places which are so clearly committed to
other purposes that their use for the airing of grievances is anomalous .... But this is
quite different from saying that all public places are off limits to people with griev-
ances." Id. (emphasis added). See also Stone, supra note 32, at 249. Stone interprets the
minority's opinion to be a recognition that a person's right "to utilize public property for
the exercise of First Amendment rights turns, not on the common law property rights of
the state but, rather, on whether, in each instance, the particular form of communication
involved seriously interferes with the normal uses to which the property is put." Stone,
supra note 32, at 249 (emphasis added).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/4
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Six years and five new justices"' later, in Grayned v. City of
Rockford, the Supreme Court adopted a public forum analysis
which signalled a retreat from the Court's former position focus-
ing on the government's ability to deny access to nontraditional
public property under its control."1 Justice Marshall, writing for
a seven-member majority,72 stated that "[the crucial question
[in public forum analysis] is whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular
place at a particular time. ' 78 Marshall further stated that "[o]ur
cases make clear that in assessing the reasonableness of a regula-
tion, we must weigh heavily the fact that communication is in-
volved; the regulation must be narrowly tailored to further the
State's legitimate interest." '
The implication to be drawn from this statement "is a pre-
sumption of speaker access to all public places '7 5 which can only
be overcome in those instances where the government control-
ling the forum can clearly demonstrate that the proposed man-
ner of expression is "functionally incompatible" with the normal
use of the forum.76 The Grayned analysis represents a funda-
69. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist replaced Justices
Clark, Fortas, Warren, Black, and Harlan, respectively. See Stone, supra note 32, at 250-
51.
70. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). In Grayned, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
municipal anti-noise ordinance which prohibited any person "while on public or private
grounds adjacent to any building in which a school or any class thereof is in session...
[from making] ... any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or
good order of such school session or class thereof." Id. at 107-08.
71. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
72. Justice Marshall was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Brennan, Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 104.
73. Id. at 116. In response to Justice Marshall's statement announcing the public
forum analysis to be applied in Grayned, Professor Stone remarked that "the right to a
public forum came of age." Stone, supra note 32, at 251.
74. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116-17.
75. Werhan, supra note 32, at 412 (emphasis added). "The presumption shifts the
burden to the government custodian to make a particularized showing of functional in-
compatibility of the manner of expression with the normal activity conducted at the
forum. The inconsistency of the content of expression ... with governmental interest is
irrelevant to the analysis." Id.
76. Id. Werhan considers the Grayned approach to be the culmination of the bal-
ancing methodology initially fashioned by the Court in Schneider v. New Jersey, 308
U.S. 147 (1939), for the purpose of evaluating the claims of individuals seeking to exer-
cise their speech rights on public property. See Werhan, supra note 32, at 411-12. For a
discussion of Schneider, see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. "The Court rec-
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mentally fair approach, because it permits accommodation of
conflicting interests in a publicly owned property, to the extent
that such interests may be accommodated, rather than denying
speakers access in the first instance, with no attempt made to-
wards accommodation, merely because the property is deemed
to be a nonpublic forum."
3. The Nonpublic Forum
Unfortunately, the public forum analysis advocated in
Grayned78 met an untimely demise. 79 Two years later, in Leh-
man v. City of Shaker Heights,80 Chief Justice Burger, along
with Justices White and Rehnquist, abandoned their former
Grayned approach"1 and joined Justice Blackmun in a plurality
ognized that these [conflicting] claims implicated two sets of public interests - that the
primary purpose for which the property is maintained be protected and that freedom of
expression not be unduly hindered." Werhan, supra note 32, at 411.
77. Werhan describes the Grayned approach as a "unitary, functional approach."
Werhan, supra note 32, at 378. This approach initially treats all public property equally,
and then proceeds to balance the interests of individual speakers seeking access to the
property against the interests of the public as a whole in maintaining the property for its
normal function. Id. at 378-84 (emphasis added). Contrast this unitary, functional ap-
proach with the Court's current public forum/nonpublic forum approach which denies
speakers access to public properties deemed to be nonpublic forums without ever at-
tempting to balance the countervailing interests involved. See infra text accompanying
note 99. For a somewhat novel and graphic representation of how the Court's current
public forum/nonpublic forum approach fails to adequately protect the fundamental first
amendment right of freedom of expression, see Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 32.
Through the use of diagrams, a matrix, and mathematical symbols, the author of the
Note compares the "unitary" approach of Grayned with the Court's current "bifurcated"
public forum/nonpublic forum approach and concludes that "[i]f the goal is protecting
freedom of expression as mandated by the first amendment, the purpose is better served
by the unitary approach, which consistently provides at least comparable, and theoreti-
cally superior, protection of these rights." Id. at 166.
78. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
79. Werhan observes that, after formulating the Grayned analysis, "the Court never
truly followed ... [this analysis] in a public forum controversy." Werhan, supra note 32,
at 412.
80. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). Harry J. Lehman, an Ohio State Representative candidate
for a district encompassing the city of Shaker Heights, attempted to promote his candi-
dacy by purchasing advertising space on the Shaker Heights Rapid Transit System. Id.
at 299. The transit system was comprised of 55 cars and each car contained 20 advertis-
ing spaces. Id. at 300 n.3. Pursuant to city council action, no political advertising had
been permitted on the vehicles of the system during the 26 years that it was operated
publicly. Id. at 300-01.
81. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
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opinion82 which relegated available commercial advertising space
on vehicles of a city transit system to a nonpublic forum cate-
gory. 3 Absent from the opinion was any attempt to balance con-
flicting interests.8 4 Also absent was the requirement that the
government entity involved must clearly demonstrate that the
proposed expressive activity is actually incompatible with the
normal use of the place under consideration. 5 Instead, the pub-
lic forum/nonpublic forum distinction adopted in Lehman re-
sulted in two correspondingly distinct levels of scrutiny to be
applied. Strict scrutiny 87 would continue to be applied in those
instances where government restrictions were placed in a public
forum.8 8 However, those identical restrictions on expressive ac-
tivity would warrant only a deferential reasonableness test if
imposed on expressive activity conducted in a nonpublic
forum.90
Subsequent cases indicate that the public forum/nonpublic
forum distinction continues to be relied upon by a sufficient
number of Supreme Court Justices to result in decisions that
82. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 298. Justice Douglas filed a separate concurring opinion. Id.
at 305 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas relied on a captive audience theory to
defeat Mr. Lehman's claim of a constitutional right of access to a public forum. Id. at
305-08. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stewart, Marshall,
and Powell joined. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304.
No First Amendment forum is here to be found. The city consciously has limited
access to its transit system advertising space in order to minimize chances of
abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audi-
ence. These are reasonable legislative objectives advanced by the city in a propri-
etary capacity. In these circumstances, there is no First or Fourteenth Amend-
ment violation.
Id. (emphasis added). For an explanation of the Court's application of strict scrutiny and
the reasonableness test, see supra notes 3, 2 respectively.
84. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302-04. The plurality's determination in this case that no
public forum existed freed the Court from the necessity of engaging in any balancing and
permitted the Court to defer to the judgment of the city council.
85. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
86. 418 U.S. at 302-04.
87. For an explanation of the courts' application of strict scrutiny, see supra note 3.
88. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302. The requirement of strict scrutiny is implied in the
Court's recognition that in "traditional [public forum] settings . . . First Amendment
values inalterably prevail." Id.
89. See supra note 2.
90. See supra note 2. See also Werhan, supra note 32, at 412; Note, Constitutional
Law, supra note 32, at 163-64.
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often deny individuals access to public property in order to exer-
cise their constitutionally guaranteed right to speak. In Greer v.
Spock,9 1 for example, the Court held that a military base was a
nonpublic forum, thus precluding the application of strict scru-
tiny to restrictions on speaker access. 2 A more recent and more
extreme use of the public forum/nonpublic forum distinction oc-
curred in Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n.93
In Perry, the Court categorized an interschool mail system and
teacher mailboxes as a nonpublic forum, and refused to acknowl-
edge that a first amendment violation existed where a rival
union was denied the access to the interschool system that had
been granted to the union certified as the teachers' exclusive
representative.9 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, strongly criti-
cized the majority for "focusing on the public forum issue [and]
disregard[ing] the First Amendment's central proscription
against censorship in the form of viewpoint discrimination, in
any forum, public or nonpublic." 95
Another case exemplifying the disparity that results when
public property is labeled a nonpublic forum is Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc."' Justice
O'Connor, speaking for a plurality,97 concluded that the Com-
bined Federal Campaign, a government charity drive, was a non-
91. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
92. Id. at 838-40.
93. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
94. Id. at 54-55.
95. Id. at 57.
96. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
97. Id. at 789. Justice O'Connor was joined in her opinion by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White and Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, filed a
dissenting opinion. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion. Justices Marshall
and Powell took no part in the decision.
It is interesting to speculate on whether the outcome in this case would have been
different had Justices Marshall and Powell participated in the decision. Both justices are
advocates of the balancing approach adopted in Grayned. See supra notes 70-77 and
accompanying text. Moreover, Justices Marshall and Powell have both been strongly
critical of the public forum/nonpublic forum distinction. See supra text accompanying
note 95. Additionally, if Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Cornelius is viewed in
conjunction with the dissenting opinion of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Ste-
vens in Perry, it is evident that a clear majority of the Court was dissatisfied with the
public forum/nonpublic forum distinction as it was being applied by the Court when
Cornelius was decided.
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public forum, thus permitting the government to exclude
speaker access by advancing only "reasonable" justification for
such exclusion.'8 In a lengthy dissent, Justice Blackmun strongly
criticized the plurality's analysis:
Rather than recognize that a nonpublic forum is a place where
expressive activity would be incompatible with the purposes the
property is intended to serve, the Court states that a nonpublic
forum is a place where we need not even be concerned about
whether expressive activity is incompatible with the purposes of
the property. Rather than taking the nature of the property into
account in balancing the First Amendment interests of the
speaker and society's interests in freedom of speech against the
interests served by reserving the property to its normal use, the
Court simply labels the property [a nonpublic forum] and dis-
penses with the balancing."
Justice Blackmun's observations clearly reflect the position that
the Court's designation of public property as a nonpublic forum
is fundamentally unfair and represents an erosion of first
amendment rights.
III. Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.
A. The Facts
On July 13, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners
adopted Resolution No. 13787, which provided, inter alia, that
"the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Air-
port is not open for First Amendment activities by any individ-
ual and/or entity."' 00 On July 6, 1984, Alan Howard Snyder, a
minister of the Gospel for Jews for Jesus, while engaged in the
distribution of free religious literature on a pedestrian walkway
in the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Air-
port, was stopped by an airport peace officer, who showed Sny-
der a copy of the resolution and explained that Snyder's actions
were in violation of the resolution.101 The officer asked Snyder to
leave LAX, and warned him that the City of Los Angeles would
98. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797.
99. Id. at 820-21.
100. Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2568, 2570 (1987).
101. Id.
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pursue legal action against him if he refused to leave.10 2 There-
upon, Snyder ceased his activity and departed the airport.10 3
Subsequently, Snyder and Jews for Jesus filed an action in
the District Court for the Central District of California.'" They
challenged the constitutionality of the resolution under the Cali-
fornia and Federal Constitutions: 10 5
First, respondents contended that the resolution was facially un-
constitutional under Art. I, § 2, of the California Constitution and
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because
it bans all speech in a public forum. Second, they alleged that the
resolution had been applied to Jews for Jesus in a discriminatory
manner. Finally, respondents urged that the resolution was un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad. 06
B. Lower Court Opinions
The case came before the United States District Court for
the Central District of California for trial on January 8, 1985.107
The sole ,issue addressed by the court was whether Resolution
No. 13787 was constitutional.0 8
The district court determined the pivotal question to be
"whether a municipally-owned and operated airport terminal is
a public forum."'1 9 Citing Kuszynski v. City of Oakland1" as
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit at B-i, Jews for Jesus [hereinafter Board's Petition]. The memorandum
decision of the district court was not reported. It was, however, included as Appendix B
in the Board's petition for a writ of certiorari. Hereinafter, cites to the memorandum
decision will be accomplished by reference to the page numbers as they appear in the
Board's petition for a writ of certiorari.
108. Id. at B-3.
109. Id. at B-4.
110. 479 F.2d 1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 1973) (portions of an ordinance which regulated
the dissemination of ideas at a public airport by requiring that materials for distribution
first be submitted to the airport manager and that the identity of distributors and the
purpose of the distribution be disclosed, held invalid by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit because such portions were unreasonably restrictive and, as written, per-
mitted acts of censorship on the part of airport officials).
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"the seminal case on the subject,"11' the court found it "obvious
... that airports are public forums.""' 2 The court cited Rosen v.
Port of Portland"s as further support for its holding that air-
ports are public forums." 4 In Rosen, an ordinance which re-
quired individuals wishing to exercise their rights of free speech
to provide port authorities with both advance notice and the
identity of the individuals and their sponsors was held to be un-
constitutional."' The district court stated that "if Portland can-
not require advance notice by and identification of leafleters,
Los Angeles cannot ban them all together.""' The court then
concluded that "LAX is a public forum and the challenged Res-
olution is unconstitutional."""
The district court completely rejected the Board's argument
that, unlike other airports that "chose to be public forums by
enacting time, place, and manner restrictions," LAX had chosen
to remain a nonpublic forum." 8 The court stated that this argu-
ment was not supported by fact or law."19 It noted that the facts
stipulated to by the defendant disclosed a history of use of the
Central Terminal Area at LAX for first amendment purposes
and other matters unrelated to travel. 2 The court also found
that the Board's legal support for such an argument was under-
mined by Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 2' where the
same argument'22 made with respect to a bus terminal was re-
jected by the Second Circuit. 23 According to the district court,
111. Board's Petition at B-4.
112. Id. at B-5.
113. 641 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1981).
114. Board's Petition at B-5, B-6.
115. 641 F.2d at 1244, 1252.
116. Board's Petition at B-6. This is the converse of Justice Edward White's now
infamous argument in Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). See supra text accom-
panying note 36. In Davis, Justice White argued that where the government has a
greater power it is free to exercise a lesser degree of that power. Davis, 167 U.S. at 48.
The district court in Jews for Jesus, indicated that where the government lacks even
that lesser power it certainly cannot exercise a greater power. See Board's Petition at B-
6.
117. Board's Petition at B-6 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at B-6 to B-7.
121. 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968).
122. See supra text accompanying note 118.
123. Wolin, 392 F.2d at 89.
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"[s]treets, parks and airports do not become public forums be-
cause government consents to their use as such. They are public
forums, as the Supreme Court explained in Hague, because they
are traditional gathering places for the citizenry. They are held
in trust by government for public use.' 1 24 After citing recent
cases wherein "the Supreme Court [had] grappled with difficult
questions of what constitutes a public forum,"' 25 the district
court found no difficulty in finding that "[a]n airport used by an
estimated 60 million people a year is a public forum,"12 and
concluded that the LAX resolution banning first amendment ac-
tivity is unconstitutional. 2 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the decision and reiterated much of the district court's
reasoning.28 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit cited cases wherein
other circuits found airports to be public forums. 2 The circuit
court then concluded that, because the Central Terminal Area at
LAX is a "traditional public forum,'' 130 the LAX resolution
which banned "all First Amendment activity rather than setting
forth reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on such ac-
tivity, . . .is unconstitutional on its face.''
The Board subsequently petitioned for and was granted cer-
124. Board's Petition at B-7. See also supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
125. Board's Petition at B-7.
126. Id.
127. Id. at B-7 to B-8.
128. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Comm'rs, 785 F.2d 791, 793-95 (9th Cir.
1986).
129. Id. at 794-95 (citing Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981) (local
ordinance which provided, inter alia, for a blanket prohibition of both the solicitation
and the distribution of literature within the terminal buildings of a public airport held to
be an unconstitutionally overbroad restriction on "First Amendment activity within a
public forum"); U.S. Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United
States, 708 F.2d 760, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (government ban on political advertising
within airport terminal advertising areas held to be unconstitutional "[in the absence of
demonstrably compelling countervailing reasons," because airport terminals are public
forums) (emphasis added); Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d
921 (7th Cir.), (airport terminal buildings held to be public forums, thus precluding air-
port officials from denying individuals the right to distribute literature in those open
areas of the terminals resembling public thoroughfares), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992
(1975).
130. Jews for Jesus, 785 F.2d at 795.
131. Id. For an explanation of time, place, and manner restrictions, see supra note
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tiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 32 The questions
presented for review in the Board's petition were:
1. May an airport operator constitutionally limit the uses of
the interiors of its terminal facilities to their dedicated and in-
tended airport-related purposes or are those facilities public fo-
rums that require the airport operator to permit their use for
non-airport related activities?
2. If the interiors of the terminal facilities at Los Angeles
International Airport are not public forums, is the Board of Air-
port Commissioners' policy that limits the uses of those facilities
to airport-related purposes a reasonable exercise of its right to
reserve the uses of the terminal facilities to their dedicated and
intended airport-related purposes? 33
C. The Supreme Court Opinions
1. The Majority
Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed
the lower court's conclusion that the resolution banning all first
amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area at Los
Angeles International Airport was unconstitutional on its face.""
The Court, however, based its decision on the first amendment
overbreadth doctrine:
[A]n individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited
is permitted to challenge a statute on its face "because it also
threatens others not before the court - those who desire to en-
gage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from do-
ing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law
declared partially invalid." '
The majority found that, because the resolution "pro-
hibit[ed] all protected expression,' 3I 6 the ban swept too broadly
with the result that "virtually every individual who enters LAX
may be found to violate the resolution by engaging in some
132. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Comm'rs, 107 S. Ct. 61 (1986).
133. Board's Petition at i.
134. Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2568 (1987).
135. Id. at 2571 (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503
(1985)). For an explanation of the overbreadth doctrine, see supra notes 16-31 and ac-
companying text.
136. Id. at 2572.
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'First Amendment activit[y].' ",137 Moreover, the majority con-
cluded that the broad language of the resolution defied any lim-
iting construction which might save the resolution. 3 ' This reli-
ance on the overbreadth doctrine freed the Jews for Jesus
majority from the necessity of deciding "whether LAX is indeed
a public forum."'13 9
2. The Concurrence
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, filed the
following two-sentence concurring opinion:
I join the Court's opinion but suggest that it should not be taken
as indicating that a majority of the Court considers the Los Ange-
les International Airport to be a traditional public forum. That
issue was one of the questions on which we granted certiorari, and
we should not have postponed it for another day.""
IV. Analysis
The Supreme Court cannot be faulted for using the first
amendment overbreadth doctrine"' to declare that the Los An-
geles International Airport resolution is unconstitutional."' As
the Court aptly noted, the resolution forbade all expressive ac-
tivity in the Central Terminal Area at LAX.'43 If carried to its
logical extreme, the resolution "prohibits even talking and read-
ing, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing
... . [S]uch a ban cannot be justified even if LAX were a non-
public forum because no conceivable governmental interest
would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech.' " The Su-
preme Court is to be faulted, however, for its failure to use this
case as a vehicle to restore to the public forum doctrine the fun-
damental fairness which has been lacking since the Court aban-
doned the balancing approach"15 to public forum analysis origi-
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2571.
140. Id. at 2573.
141. See supra notes 7, 134-139, and accompanying text.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 134-139.
143. Jews for Jesus, 107 S. Ct. at 2572.
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
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nally adopted in Grayned v. City of Rockford.1"6
The strong dissents presented in Lehman,'4 7 Perry,148 and
Cornelius,149 the cases cited as examples of the Supreme Court's
current public forum approach,150 provide cogent evidence that
the Court's use of the public forum/nonpublic forum distinction
continues to trouble individual members of the Court.' 5' Addi-
tionally, commentators who have addressed public forum analy-
sis favor the Court's adoption of an approach which will ade-
quately balance competing interests in publicly owned property,
before reaching a determination that a restriction on expressive
activity is warranted in a particular case.152 Such balancing is in
stark contrast to the Supreme Court's current approach which,
in effect, denies the exercise of first amendment rights at the
outset when public property is labeled a nonpublic forum."S
Further evidence of the need for a balanced approach to
public forum analysis is apparent in the circumstances sur-
rounding the Jews for Jesus case. Had the Supreme Court not
adopted a public forum/nonpublic forum distinction, the Board
of Airport Commissioners would have had no reason to attempt
to have the reviewing courts, including the Supreme Court, rec-
ognize LAX as a nonpublic forum.""
Assuming that the Board's resolution had been more nar-
rowly tailored (thus eliminating the overbreadth problem) and
that LAX had been held to be a nonpublic forum, 55 the Board
would have been free to prohibit various types of communica-
tion entirely, so long as it acted reasonably and the prohibition
was content-neutral.'" In other words, the applicable standard
146. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 10, 80-90, and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 11, 93-95, and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 12, 96-99, and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 80, 83, 93, 94, 96-98, and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 13, 95, 99, and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 32.
153. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
155. For those skeptics who contend that this is too great an assumption, see Acorn
v. City of Phoenix, 603 F. Supp. 869 (D. Ariz. 1985) (traffic intersections held to be
nonpublic forums, in spite of the public forum status long afforded to streets and parks).
But see Acorn v. City of New Orleans, 606 F. Supp. 16 ( E.D. La. 1984) (traffic intersec-
tions held to be traditional public forums).
156. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (Fort Dix military base deemed not to
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of judicial review would be the deferential reasonableness test.157
If on the other hand, a reviewing court declared LAX to be a
public forum, then that same narrowly tailored resolution would
be subjected to the significantly more stringent strict scrutiny
standard. 58
The foregoing hypotheticals serve to highlight the disparate
treatment afforded speakers seeking access to public property
when the Supreme Court applies its current public forum/non-
public forum analysis. They also indicate that the majority
should have heeded Justice White's advice and confronted the
public forum issue presented in Jews for Jesus. 59 The Court
should have seized upon the opportunity presented in Jews for
Jesus to renounce its use of the outcome-determinative' 60 public
forum/nonpublic forum analysis and to announce its return to
the balancing approach articulated in Grayned,'6e which insured
that speakers' interests would at least be considered, regardless
of the type of public property involved.
Implicit in such an announcement would be the need for
lower courts to resume their traditional role of balancing'62 to
assure that first amendment expressive activity is restricted only
if the "manner of expression is basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."'6 Ad-
be a public forum, thus enabling the Court to deny the existence of any "generalized
constitutional right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets at Fort Dix"); United
States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civil Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1980) (letterbox
approved by the United States Postal Service deemed not to be a public forum, thus
permitting the Court to hold constitutional a federal statute prohibiting the depositing
of all unstamped mail into such letterbox).
157. See supra note 2.
158. See supra notes 2 and 3.
159. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
160. See Dienes, supra note 32, at 117. Dienes asserts that "no government regula-
tion of the nonpublic forum has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
Id.
161. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 155. The Acorn cases cited represent the two extreme positions
taken by lower courts. Where public property is held to be a nonpublic forum, a court
may adopt a deferential approach to government regulation. On the other hand, if a
court holds public property to be a public forum, the presumption exists that any gov-
ernment regulation is unconstitutional. Such extreme approaches serve to highlight the
lower courts' abandonment of their traditional balancing role in those instances where
courts find a property to be a nonpublic forum.
163. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
[Vol. 8:607
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/4
JEWS FOR JESUS
ditionally, government officials would be forewarned that any re-
strictions they attempted to impose on first amendment rights
would be strictly scrutinized, and that they would bear the
heavy burden of showing that the above-mentioned basic incom-
patibility exists.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's failure to take the opportunity
presented in Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.'"
to correct the problems that plague current public forum analy-
sis is regrettable. As long as the Court continues to divide pub-
licly owned property into two distinct categories, each with a
radically different level of first amendment protection, govern-
ment entities will continue to avail themselves of the argument
that property under their control falls into the nonpublic forum
category.
From government's point of view, this is understandable, for
to do otherwise would subject its regulations and restrictions to
the strict scrutiny of the courts. " Similarly, the lower courts, in
many instances, will have the option of labeling publicly owned
property as a nonpublic forum, thus relieving them of their re-
sponsibility to balance an individual's constitutional right to
speak against competing state interests. As a result, a speaker
could be denied access to a property simply because the prop-
erty was already being used for a less compelling (and possibly
not incompatible) societal function. 66
This fundamentally unfair situation will be corrected only
when the Supreme Court replaces its current public forum/non-
public forum analysis with a Graynede7 -type balancing ap-
proach to resolve issues involving speaker access to public prop-
erty. Under a Grayned-type approach, both government officials
and lower courts would be precluded from ever again using the
"nonpublic forum" label to deny a speaker access to a public
164. 107 S. Ct. 2568 (1987).
165. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
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property in order to exercise his most essential first amendment
freedoms.
Lonnie S. Davis
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